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Abstract. The late twentieth century saw an upsurge of visual artworks
that vindicate the importance of artworks that show the pain endured by
victims of political violence in the name of art’s unique ability to create
shared memories. However, it is unclear what kind of memories art can
create, and how can it create them. One common answer is that art can
communicate empathically the most intimate perceptual aspects of pain
and engrave them deeply in the spectator’s mind. This paper proposes to
consider that question and evaluate this answer within the framework pro-
vided by the cognitive theory of emotions (Nussbaum 2003; Goldie 2000).
I will ﬁrst provide an analysis of an artwork by Colombian artist Doris Sal-
cedo with the help of the theory of “criterial prefocusing” (Carroll 1998).
This allows me to claim that the artistic and political importance of this art-
works derives from the fact that it does not only try to generate empathy,
but models it through compassion. The strength and depth of the emotion
makes the experience memorable, but the cognitive structure of compas-
sion imposes certain conditions in what kind of memory can be generated:
it’s a memory not of the events recreated and not from the point of view
of the victim, but a memory of the experience of the work and from the
point of view of the spectator.
1. Introduction
The following reﬂections address the assumptions and aspirations of some
artworks that focus on the memory of pain. My main example will be
the Atrabiliarios, by Colombian artist Doris Salcedo, but I think this char-
acterization applies as well to the work of other Colombian artists, like
Erika Diettes (Río Abajo) and Clemencia Echeverri (Treno). These visual
artworks deal with a physically, geographically, and politically localized
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pain: the pain suﬀered by the families of people disappeared in Colombia.
They also share a strategy for artistically transﬁguring this pain. They do
not represent it through characters, nor do they contain any explicit nar-
rative, or a history that may indicate what has happened or even whether
anything has happened. They make the pain present only through the ob-
jects, the remains of personal life that the disappeared left behind. They
all try to create community in pain and, through it, solidarity. The prefer-
ence for oblique representation, the direct participation they give to the
subjects they work with, the urgent need that impulses them, and the hope
they put in the eﬀect of their work are all revealing of the demands that
fall on contemporary art.
Doris Salcedo has been particularly explicit about it and has stated, for
example:
And, if I did anything right, then some aspects of the lives that
were lost maybe are present. Then maybe the viewer can connect
with those aspects. I think we all have memories of pain, and those
memories maybe can connect with the memories of pain inscribed
in these pieces.(San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, 2004).
Erika Diettes has also commented on her own work in similar terms:
I was obsessed with capturing that suﬀocation of cry. When you see
people inhale, but they forget to exhale. Is like something becoming
breathless. I became obsessed with generating in images that “si-
lence of pain”. So I devoted myself to see how people cried, how
in that pain there is a point when there are no tears, when the cry
is more internal than tears. In that moment I decided that I didn’t
want to photograph pain as such but the pause of pain. Is such a deep
pain (…). That’s why I tell you, there is a point that you reach when
you ﬁnd that there is so much on top of so much, so much, in an
excess of excesses that is diﬃcult for words or tears to translate. Cry
itself is not enough. That is why there is something like a suﬀocation
of crying. It’s not even crying. I don’t know, I insisted that the
image had to be somehow palpable, that it had to be like listening
that crying (quoted by Calle, 2008).
These artworks assume the task of overcoming barriers created by the lack
of understanding and of interest, and try to create a place, a node in space
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and time in which a shared experience between spectators, victims and
artists is possible.
This conviction is accompanied by an ambition to memory, insofar as
it presupposes that inside these artworks some experiences survive that
otherwise would be lost in oblivion or wouldn’t come to be part of common
life.
But, is it possible to condense pain in an object? How and in what sense
could these artworks create a place for a memory of pain? The statements
made by these artists seem to indicate that the mobilization of the emo-
tions of the spectator plays a central role in the process, and that if these
artworks get to be unforgettable it is because theymoveus. It is the force
and depth of the emotional reaction these works generate that makes an
impact on our understanding of the experience of others.
2. Compassion and Fear as Value Judgments
Aristotle’s theory of tragedy oﬀers the classical -and still powerful- frame-
work to think about the problems provoked by the artistic representation
of human suﬀering. In his Poetics, he conceives the reaction to tragedy
as a combination of fear and compassion mediated by the work and di-
rected towards the pain of another being. The importance he bestows
upon this emotional response is evident in several passages of Poetics, for
example when he aﬃrms that in tragedy “the imitation is not only of a
complete action but of fearful and pitiable things [...]”(Aristotle, 2001,
1452a 1-2); or that recognition [anagnorisis] and reversal [peripeteia] “guide
the soul”(Aristotle, 2001, 1450a 34) by arousing compassion and fear. He
also claims that these emotions may be provoked by the spectacle or the
“suﬀering”[pathos], that is, by the physical presence of destruction and
damage on the stage, but ideally they should derive from the structure
of the story [mythos] itself: “For the story must have been put together
in such a way that, even without seeing, he who hears the events as they
come to be shudders and pities from what occurs [...].” (Aristotle, 2001,
1453b 1-7)
This applies also to artworks like those of Doris Salcedo, as in this
case the answer expected from the viewer does not seem to be cold, so to
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speak, but emotionally charged. These artworks convoke an emotional re-
action of fear and compassion inasmuch as they portrait the grave damage
inﬂicted upon a human life.1 Here also the structure of the artistic repre-
sentation determines normatively our emotional answer to it, and without
this reaction the experience of the work would not be complete.2
Aristotle inaugurates a tradition in philosophical thinking about the
emotions that connects directly with the cognitive turn that has led to
theories of emotion as value judgment. Both Aristotle and contemporary
cognitivist theorists consider that the core of an emotion is an ensemble
of judgments about the world (or about what is present before us) and our
relationship to it. Besides the bodily, neural, perceptual or felt compo-
nents that may be part of the emotion, certain ways of seeing the world
and judging its relationship with our own interests and needs constitute its
nucleus.3 Therefore, emotions would entail beliefs, insofar as they could
only appear when we believe the world (or what is present to us) is one
way or another. In fact, their identity as emotions of a certain kind would
be determined by these judgments, which should then be considered con-
stitutive elements. These judgments and their typical structure -and not
their supposedly particular quality of feeling – are what allows us to distin-
guish between two emotions.
When considered as value judgments -even obscure and complex value
judgments- emotions are not opposed to rationality, but are a part of it:
they refer to the world and may be considered adequate or inadequate
regarding certain objects, rational o irrational according to the reaction
they imply to the situation, and they can be corrected through a change
1 Salcedo has recognized that her work appeals to this model. In answer to the ques-
tion of what can her work contribute to the viewer, she comments: “The confrontation
with death, and specially with the death of a loved one, provokes what Aristotle called
both terror and compassion” (Salcedo, 2000, p. 134).
2 It must be noticed that emotions do not cover all of our possible aﬀective responses
to art. As Noël Carrrol (Noël Carroll, 2010) has pointed out, philosophy still has much
to investigate concerning the role of moods, reﬂexes, phobias and aﬀect programs in art.
3 Here I consider the cognitive theories of emotion, especially those for which the
emotion is a value judgment. John Deigh (Deigh, 1994), Ronald de Sousa (de Sousa,
2010) an Hjort and Lavert (Hjort & Laver, 1997) oﬀer good overviews of the cognitive
theories of the emotions and their contrast with competing theories. Among the recent
defenses of the theory of emotions as value judgments those of Robert Solomon (2004)
and Martha Nussbaum (2003) stand out.
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in the judgments that constitute them. This theory, then, tries to dissolve
the dichotomy between emotions and rationality.
This sketch of a theoretical framework might be understood more
clearly through the explication it provides for two particular emotions:
fear and compassion.
Aristotle deﬁnes fear as “a sort of pain and agitation derived from the
imagination of a future destructive or painful evil” (Aristotle, 2007, 1382a
22-23). This characterization implies an aﬀective element (the pain or ag-
itation, which can be thought of as some kind of excitement) that would
be generated and shaped by a set of judgments: the judgment of an evil
appearing to be close (and which constitutes, therefore, a danger), and the
judgment of that evil having a certain gravity.
Compassion, on the other hand, is deﬁned by Aristotle as
[...] a certain pain at an apparently destructive or painful event hap-
pening to one who does not deserve it and which a person might
expect himself or one of his own to suﬀer, and this when it seems
close at hand; for it is clear that a person who is going to feel pity
necessarily thinks that some evil is actually present of the sort that
he or one of his own might suﬀer and that this evil is of the sort
mentioned in the deﬁnition or like it or about equal to it (Aristotle,
2007, 1385b 13-19).
The pain that characterizes compassion is the sensible side of a complex
intellectual answer that demands from us much more than a simple con-
tagion of the pain felt by another person or than our imagining a terrible
situation and identifying with it. For there to be compassion, it is req-
uisite that we acknowledge that situation as something harmful for the
other and that we react with pain to that harm, recognizing at the same
time that this person is diﬀerent from us, and that what happens to her is
a possibility also open to us, so that our shared frailty becomes a common
bond.
3. The Atrabiliarios
The basic cognitive structure of compassion can guide our thinking about
the emotional eﬀect on the spectator of one of Doris Salcedo’s works, and
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help us to consider how and why compassion is one of the answers this
work demands from us. To focus on compassion is, of course, just one
possibility; one could also say that this artwork also seeks to elicit, for ex-
ample, disgust and anger, or other responses that are not to be considered
emotional or aﬀective at all, but purely cognitive, as those concerning only
the form of the work, its place in art history, its originality or lack of it,
among others.
Figure 1. Doris Salcedo, Atrabiliarios, 1992-7.
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The point I’m trying to make is that, insofar as an artwork highlights those
aspects of experience that ﬁt into the criteria required for a determinate
emotion to take place, that emotion constitutes the emotional response
towards that situation that the artwork proposes to its implicit spectator.
The concept of “criterial prefocusing”, proposed by Noël Carroll, explains
the main mechanism through which artworks produce emotions. Accord-
ing to his analysis:
Whether verbal, visual, or aural, the text will be prefocused. Certain
features of situations and characters will be made salient through
description or depiction. These features will be such that they will
be subsumable under the categories or concepts that […] govern or
determine the identity of the states we are in. Let us refer to this at-
tribute by saying that the texts are criterially prefocused (Noël Car-
roll, 1998, p. 263s.)
Figure 2. Doris Salcedo, Atrabiliarios, 1992-7.
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Atrabiliarios is the common name given by Salcedo to a set of pieces she
made in the early nineties that consist of a series of shoes arranged in
square niches excavated in the wall of the gallery. All the shoes exhibit
signs of wear; sometimes they are alone, sometimes in pairs; some are
women’s and some are men’s shoes [Figures 1 and 2].
The niches are covered by a translucent animal tissue, sewn to the wall
with surgical thread [Figure 3].
Figure 3. Doris Salcedo, Atrabiliarios, 1992-7.
As our hypothesis is that this work tries to generate compassion, we can
take the basic structure of this emotion as a guide, and consider how the
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work organizes our attention to the situation according to the relevant
criteria.
What is the object of the emotion? Our attention is directed, ﬁrst of
all, to the work itself, and through it to the disappeared. The shoes act here
as metonymic representations of the disappeared, who are made present
here indirectly, but clearly (Cf. Malagón-Kurka, 2010, p. 157; Merewether,
1998, p. 19). The shoes are almost a bodily part, and refer to the body
indexically, through the traces of quotidian use imprinted in them. In
this works, the shoes are (metonymically) people, and our emotions are
directed, through them, to the people they represent.
Figure 4. Doris Salcedo, Atrabiliarios, 1992-7.
Now, does the way in which the object is represented highlight those fea-
tures that match the typical criteria of compassion? According to Aristo-
tle, as we already quoted, compassion is “a certain pain at an apparently
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destructive or painful event happening to one who does not deserve it and
which a person might expect himself or one of his own to suﬀer, and this
when it seems close at hand [...]” (Aristotle, 2007, 1385b 13-19). The ﬁrst
criterion is damage or evil, with the additional requisite that it be grave and
visible. Aristotle demands that this evil should be shown in appearance,
brought closer to us or put before our eyes. And I think that the objects that
constitute the work indeed testify to a certain damage. In other works by
Salcedo – as her 1995 Untitled [Figure 4] – the damage inﬂicted upon the
objects is quite evident: the object is cut up, pierced, hibrydized, ﬁlled up
with concrete.
In contrast, in the Atrabiliarios the object is not altered in any visible
way. It is rather just isolated from its usual context, in such a way that
any attempt to connect them to their quotidian use leads to frustration:
they are defamiliarized. (Bennett, 2005, p. 67). Besides, they have been
installed in such a way that it is not possible to see them clearly, no mat-
ter how much the spectator approaches or distances herself from them
[Figure 5].
Figure 5. Doris Salcedo, Atrabiliarios, 1992-7.
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Their view is clouded by the ﬁlm of organic material that covers them: they
are there, just in front of us, but it is impossible to distinguish any particu-
lar feature in them, eliciting the desire to extend our hand and remove the
ﬁlm. There is a more open violence in the aggressiveness of the stitches
that sew this organic ﬁlm to the wall: with their irregular and cramped
distribution they resemble hasty, uneven and brutal crossing outs.
This corresponds to an important aspect of the damage suﬀered by
the families of the disappeared: it is not so much a direct physical dam-
age to the body of a family member as a damage to the fabric of the life
they shared. The disappeared never leave their family completely, because
life keeps taking them into account - must keep taking them into account:
they are still there, even if they can only be seen through the opaque lenses
of remembrance and hope, without direct contact (just like these shoes).
Violence and damage are subtly represented, but with the utmost depth.
The animal ﬁber of the ﬁlm with its slightly repulsive character exposes
this damage clearly. The reference to the disappeared and the quality of
the damage represented are impossible to determine without contextual
information, but it is nonetheless presented to the spectator as something
experientially present through the visual and spatial relationship she is in-
vited to have with the artwork.
Aristotle also demands, for there to be compassion, that the person
suﬀering damage do not deserve it. We usually don’t feel compassion for
those who ’had it coming’. But even if the damage is a punishment for
something the person has done, we can feel compassion if this punishment
is exaggerated and is disproportionate to the transgression that originates
it. Does this criterion apply to the case in point? I think this depends
on our knowing that many of the disappeared were, as a matter of fact,
innocent, and were only punished for stepping up for their communities
(as many a syndicalist and community leader). But, even if they had done
something, their families haven’t. The families of the disappeared are al-
ways innocent in this sense, so that there is a punishment that is not jus-
tiﬁed for any blame; and even if we accused those families of having done
something wrong, of having contributed somehow to this situation, the
punishment they receive for it turns out to be always unjust and dispro-
portionate, “insofar as nothing justiﬁes the ordeal of chasing the ghost of
a loved one, the pain of not being able to give closure to mourning”– as
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Ileana Diéguez has pointed out. What could anyone have done to deserve
this? And who has the right to execute this sentence?
Finally, we may consider the condition of likeness, the idea according to
which the damage represented in the work should also appear as a danger
to us and we should be made aware that we too are exposed to it. The
experience of compassion demands and fosters the consciousness of our
own frailty exposing the frailty of the others and emphasizing what makes
us similar. This emotion situates us in a common space with the person
that suﬀers damage. This is the reason why Aristotle speaks of compassion
as an emotion that has fear as one of its components or is accompanied
by it, especially in the experience of tragedy: I feel compassion for those
things that I fear may aﬀect me and those close to me. For this reason,
compassion doesn’t imply a position of superiority (in that case it would
be mere benevolence), but a more horizontal relationship with the other.
Considered from this point of view, compassion is not an experience of
identiﬁcation. I do not become another person. It is rather – I insist –
an experience of getting closer to the other, of acknowledging a common
space in an experience that opens itself up to the future: this might also
happen to me.
In the artwork we are talking about, this is achieved through the quo-
tidian and commonplace aspect of these shoes. They are not only metony-
mically associated to the bodies of the disappeared, but constitute objects
that we all possess and use. In this way, they bring our own daily life into
play. The object serves as a point in which the personal memories of each
of the onlookers converges, and so shows forth our shared humanity with
those who have suﬀered these ordeals.
This eﬀect is also reinforced by what one could call the indexical ap-
pearance of the work. The objects look as if they had been used by the
disappeared themselves, as if they still kept traces of their bodies. Peo-
ple familiarized with Doris Salcedo’s work knows that in many occasions
the families of the disappeared have given her memorabilia of their loved
ones. As far as I know, she doesn’t directly use these objects as part of the
work, but the pieces she selects do look like they were. The viewer may
entertain the idea that these shoes prove the historical fact that somebody
existed and disappeared, that this objects testimony the actuality of these
events, and so be almost forced to recognize that it is not just ﬁction, but
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an actual possibility.
4. Memory and Compassion
So far, we have considered how the Atrabiliarios may arouse compassion
and fear in the spectator. Our interpretation of the work has concentrated
itself in showing that this happens when, through its formal structure, its
choice of materials and the articulation of their connotations, the work
makes possible for the spectator to understand perceptually and aﬀec-
tively some of the experiences constitutive of the impossible mourning
in which the families of the disappeared are trapped. The defenselessness
of the families before an aggression that erodes the fabric of quotidian life,
the collision between the duty of keeping hope alive and the impossibility
to materialize its presence, the distance that separates them from their
loved ones, are all made present through the material analogues that give
them expression. Through these sensitive analogues the spectator reaches
something like an internal perspective that allows her to imagine aspects
of these families’ experiences.
Is it possible and adequate to say that these artworks condense the
pain of the families of the disappeared and keep it inside them, crystalliz-
ing these experiences for collective memory? Is the artwork a device that
allows a community to live an otherwise private experience? Some artis-
tic declarations suggest as much. For example Doris Salcedo aﬃrms that,
through the work, “the experience had to be taken to a collective space”,
and Clemencia Echeverri indicates that the task imposed on her seemed
to be “to generate in images that ’silence of pain’”that she perceived in the
mothers of the disappeared.
This is a tempting idea that captures the fact that artworks allow an
approach more immediate and sensitive to experiences than a cold descrip-
tion could. Nonetheless, taking into account the ideas on compassion and
fear developed in this text, it would be possible and necessary to introduce
a correction – or rather, a precision – into it. The core of this precision
is that our pain before the work is not and cannot be identical to the pain
these families feel, even if the artwork allows a shared aﬀective experience
for spectators.
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Our emotional and aﬀective response cannot be equated to that of the
families of the disappeared, not only because we are numerically diﬀerent
individuals -it is entirely possible that several people feel a shared pleasure
or pain before the same situation, for example when we all react with hap-
piness before a shared victory, or with pain before a lost that aﬀects us all
the same way. What makes our response necessarily dissimilar is that our
position before this situation is radically diﬀerent, and this diﬀerence pen-
etrates and transforms the whole of the experience. A work like this can
oﬀer us a rich aﬀective image of the situation or, at least, certain aspects
of it, but these images, aﬀects and perceptions are coordinated from the
perspective of a witness that contemplates the suﬀering of others without
being able nor needing to do anything for them at the moment. Although
sometimes we speak as if we identiﬁed with those who suﬀer, we must rec-
ognize that we are only spectators, at the same time powerless and safe in
the space of the gallery or the museum. We do not fear for our lives nor are
we forced to do anything for those people at the moment. It is precisely
this freedom from the oppressing urges of immediate action that allows
us to linger in this situation and focus on it, opening up a space where we
can try to understand it and penetrate its nuances.
The work, then, may oﬀer us enough knowledge to approach the per-
spective of the victims, to ponder how terrible their situation must be
and how their worries relate to our own worries, and in this way give us
tools to imaginatively understand their suﬀerings. But to understand an
experience is not necessarily to live it, in the same sense as to understand
someone is not to identify with that person, but to undergo a process of
mediation in which I connect her point of view and mine and try to expli-
cate the genesis of her experiences and reactions. This mediation is at the
basis of compassion, and that is why to feel compassion is not to feel the
same thing that somebody else suﬀers, either by contagion or identiﬁca-
tion, but to understand why the other suﬀers and co-suﬀer with her, but
not for the same reason nor from her point of view: the perspective from
which we live our experience penetrates and transforms it into something
completely diﬀerent.
As spectators, with the safety that comes from the fact that we con-
template a representation of suﬀering and not the event itself, for us the
contemplation of these works is more similar to that oﬀered by certain
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novels which, according to Proust “(...) are like great but temporary be-
reavements, abolishing habits, bringing us one more in contact with the
reality of life, but for a few hours only...”(quoted by Nussbaum, 2003, p.
244). We might emerge from that experience transformed, enriched by a
clearer and deeper understanding of the situation, but it does not consti-
tute a part of the fabric of our life with the same weight or in the same
sense as for the victim.
I reiterate: this does not mean that nothing is shared, that this is not
a basis for a common experience. This might perhaps be made clearer
if we distinguish between the experience which the work is about and the
experience of the work. The experience of the families of the disappeared,
that the work is about, is an experience that we cannot appropriate; it
remains, so to speak, their exclusive property. But we can all share the
experience of the work. This experience of the work enters the socially
shared repertory and creates a memory of which we can all take part. This
constitutes an enrichment of the common wealth of meaning.
As mediated and induced by the work, compassion oﬀers a foundation
for solidarity, inasmuch as it broadens our imaginative capacity to take
interest in others, to worry about what happens to them and to consider
our common future. The actualization of this solidarity presupposes, of
course, ethical, political and cultural conditions that in our society exceed
the powers of art alone. But the fact that this work fosters the subjective
conditions of solidarity is, it seems to me, a substantial contribution. This
may not be the only task art must undertake, but it is a task whose dignity
we should not ignore.
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